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A new style public interest defence in libel law ensures that
rights and interests of claimants, defendants and the wider
public are properly protected
Andrew Scott and Alastair Mullis discuss the Defamation Bill making its way through
Parliament. They argue that the newly proposed amendment allows the bill to both
protect the right to reputation while also promoting the right to free speech. This
proposal introduces a ‘discursive remedy’ that would reduce the need to bring costly
claims, and a novel focus on the honesty and reasonableness of the
publisher ’s belief that publication would be in the public interest.
An interesting proposal has slipped quietly into the mix f or consideration during the
House of  Lords Committee stage deliberations on the Def amation Bill. During the
Second Reading debate, Lord Lester mooted a possible alternative to the clause 4
def ence of  responsible publication on a matter of  public interest. The Joint Committee
on Human Rights has pressed the Government on the desirability of  the new
alternative. In our view, the proposal – developed by Sir Brian Neill – of f ers an opportunity both to
improve the operation of  the existing common law def ence and to ‘t idy up’ aspects of  the existing Bill.
During the extended public and policy debates on libel ref orm, we have been crit ical of  many of  the
iterations of  proposed amendments to the law. That said, we have always considered the diagnosis of
the problems f or publisher-def endants of f ered by the Libel Ref orm campaign to be persuasive.
Fundamentally, our view has been that libel law can be so designed as to both protect the Article 8 right
to reputation and to promote, rather than necessarily to restrict, the Article 10 right to f ree speech. The
newly proposed variation to clause 4 would appear to meet that stipulation.
Until now, clause 4 of  the Bill has been essentially unremarkable in that it did lit t le more than reiterate
Reynolds in statutory f orm. For that reason, it has been crit icised by campaigners who have proposed a
good f aith or malice-based standard equivalent to the US law inspired by New York Times v Sullivan. A
public interest def ence based on good f aith alone would be easily exploited by unscrupulous publishers.
It is alternatively the ‘Tim-Nice-But-Dim’ def ence, or the ‘I’m Mendacious But Can Hold a Straight Face’
def ence. It is not suited to the constitutional f ramework that prevails in the UK or Europe more broadly. It
would clearly not be compliant with the Convention on account of  its f ailure to allow any opportunity to
consider the proportionality of  the restriction it would impose on the right to reputation.
The third option recently developed by Sir Brian Neill and aired by Lord Lester would introduce a
‘discursive remedy’ gateway, and then a novel f ocus on the honesty and reasonableness of  the
publisher ’s belief that publication would be in the public interest. This is dif f erent in f ocus to the current
common law def ence that asks whether the act of  publication – or communication – was ‘responsible’.
This new option should be endorsed in Parliament. It provides an opportunity to improve the def ence,
and to clarif y both its relationship with honest opinion (f ormerly f air comment: a def ence available when
an author draws a damaging inf erence f rom underpinning f acts that are alluded to in the text, if  that
inf erence could have been drawn by an honest person) and the draf ting of  the Act.
A Difference in Emphasis
There is room to debate how f ar a shif t in f ocus f rom the ‘responsibility of  journalism / communication’
to the ‘reasonableness of  belief  that publication is in the public interest’ would entail any substantive
change. We think there are two areas in which this approach would change, or at least clarif y the law. The
f irst arises because there have always been two views as to what the Reynolds def ence should achieve:
(a) it should provide f or a publisher to evade liability only when an important publication that is believed
to be true and def ensible in court when published ult imately proves to have been wrong, or (b) it should
also allow publication of  allegations that the publisher strongly considers to be true, but thinks are
perhaps likely not to be def ensible in court (f or example, because a highly credible source will not testif y,
cannot ethically be asked to testif y, or may be thought emotionally incapable of  withstanding cross-
examination). In this second scenario, the allegations may well be true, but not provably so in court. It
would seem to us that the test proposed by Lord Lester would much more clearly encompass both of
these scenarios.
The second change or clarif ication rests on the f act that the honesty and reasonableness def ence
would shif t attention away f rom the manner in which allegations were levelled. In his seminal speech in
Reynolds, Lord Nicholls identif ied “the tone of  the article” as one of  the f actors relevant to responsibility.
Whether or not the manner in which the article is written should be a relevant f actor in the analysis under
clause 4 has been contested. It is at the root of  expressed concerns that the current clause does not
ref lect a purported move away f rom this requirement in the recent decision of  the Supreme Court in
Flood v Times Newspapers.
Tidying the Draft ing of the Bill
If  one accepts that judges should resist the temptation to sit in the editor ’s chair, then the Lester-Neill
proposal has a f urther benef it. It would allow a clarif ication of  the muddied water between the Reynolds
def ence and the def ence of  honest opinion that is caused by clauses 3(7)(a) and clause 4(5) in the
current Bill (and which we have highlighted previously). The f ormer subclause provides that f alse, but
Reynolds-privileged f acts can be the basis of  honest opinion; the latter that the clause 4 def ence applies
irrespective of  whether the impugned statement is one of  f act or opinion. In our view, clause 3(7)(a)
should not cite clause 4. The current provision does make sense f rom the perspective of  the original
publisher who mixes (what turns out to be Reynolds-privileged) f act and comment. It simply does not
make sense, however, f rom the perspective of  the second publisher who relies on (what turn out to be
f alse) f acts published by someone else. Under the current iteration of  the Bill, that second publisher is in
ef f ect asked to prove Reynolds by proxy: an impossible f eat.
Our solution predicated on the new proposal: clause 3(7)(a) should be excised, and a new clause 3(4)(c)
should be introduced to read, “any f act concerning a matter of  public interest that he reasonably believed
to be true at the time the statement complained of  was published”. That is, the clause 3 honest opinion
def ence should be available when the f actual basis f or opinion expressed was either true, privileged, or
reasonably believed to be true. This change, coupled with the introduction of  an honest and reasonable
belief  test in clause 4, would remove the uncomf ortable and conceptually f lawed need to apply clause 4
‘universally’ to publications that mixed statements of  f act and expression of  opinion. Whether something
was best analysed as a statement of  f act (with clause 4 applying) or of  opinion (with clause 3 applying)
would become immaterial: either way the applicable tests would be the reasonableness and honesty of
the belief  that publication was in the public interest.
Convention-Compliance
We consider that the Lester / Neill proposal would be Convention-compliant. The assessment of  whether
a journalist’s belief  was reasonable would involve essentially the same analysis in terms of  pre-
publication behaviour as that which currently is applied under the Reynolds def ence. The question would
be how the belief  was reasonable, rather than how the journalism was responsible. A well- resourced
journalist could not reach a reasonable belief  that publication was in the public interest without f irst
having done what an ethical journalist should do to stand up a story. The posit ion, and hence the
expectation, would clearly be dif f erent in the case of  the garret-room blogger or ‘below-the- line’
commenter. The Article 8 right to reputation could inf luence this analysis in the same way as it does
under the current Reynolds def ence. Moreover, the requirement to provide a discursive remedy in order to
rely on the def ence would allow a structured opportunity to vindicate reputational rights. This would
overcome claimants’ f requently f elt lack of  access to a suitable platf orm f or response.
The Discursive Remedy Gateway
As a f inal point, we consider that some attention should be given to the precise nature of  the discursive
As a f inal point, we consider that some attention should be given to the precise nature of  the discursive
remedy to be required under clause 4. It may be that af f ording a ‘right of  reply’ would be pref erable to
insisting on a correction or apology. This would be especially the case in circumstances were the
publisher wished to maintain the accuracy of  the original story. We note that the general approach under
the proposed new clause 4 is coherent in concept with our own suggestions made previously regarding
retention of  the multiple publication rule and introduction of  a correction or notice-based def ence in
pref erence to the proposed single publication rule in clause 8 of  the Bill.
We also wonder whether this change in emphasis over clause 4 should prompt a more general
reconsideration by the Lords of  the question of  whether a general right of  reply and/or correction similar
to that which exists in many jurisdictions around the world should be introduced. What most people who
complain of  having been libeled want is a swif t correction or a right of  reply. They do not want to become
embroiled in expensive and lengthy lit igation. Similarly, most responsible def endants would (or should) be
content to publish a swif t correction when the truth is pointed out to them. Where the truth is contested
they should of f er a right of  reply. In limited circumstances, English law already requires that a correction
or explanation be published. The Lester / Neill proposal would extend this f urther. A general right to a
discursive remedy could have a dramatic ef f ect on the need to bring costly claims, and would ensure that
rights and interests of  claimants, def endants and the wider public were properly protected.
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